Circulars MSC.1/Circ.1333
Adopted on 26 June 2009
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST
SHIPS
Recommendations to Governments for
preventing
and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships
1 The Maritime
Safety Committee, at its eighty-sixth session (27 May to 5 June 2009), reviewed
MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 (Recommendations to Governments for preventing and
suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships) and prepared the revised
recommendations given in the annex.
2 The revision was
carried out on the basis of the outcome of the comprehensive review of the
guidance provided by the Organization for preventing and suppressing piracy and
armed robbery against ships; and took into account the work of the
correspondence group on the review and updating of MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1,
MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 and resolution A.922(22), established by MSC 84.
3 Member
Governments, in particular those within areas identified as affected by acts of
piracy and armed robbery against ships, are recommended to take any necessary
action to implement, as appropriate, the recommendations given in the annex.
4 Member
Governments are also recommended to bring this circular and MSC.1/Circ.1334 to
the attention of all national agencies concerned with anti-piracy and
anti-armed robbery activities, shipowners, ship operators, shipping companies,
shipmasters and crews.
5 This circular
revokes MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1.
ANNEX
RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FOR
PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING PIRACY* AND ARMED ROBBERY1 AGAINST SHIPS
______________________
* The following
definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101):
"Piracy
consists of any of the following acts:
(a)
any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i)
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b)
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c)
any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
sub-paragraph (a) or (b)."
1 The
Sub-regional meeting on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western
Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea area, held in Dar es Salaam, United
Republic of Tanzania, from 14 to 18 April 2008, agreed to modify this
definition. Consistent with the ReCAAP Agreement, the "private ends"
motive has been added to the definition. The formulation "within internal
waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea" replaced "within a
State’s jurisdiction". The new formulation reflects the views of France,
supported by other States participating in the meeting, that the definition for
armed robbery against ships should not be applicable to acts committed seaward
of the territorial sea. The new definition reads: "Armed robbery against
ships" means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation,
or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and
directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship,
within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.
Piracy and armed robbery against ships
1 Before embarking
on any set of measures or recommendations, it is imperative for governmental or
other agencies concerned to gather accurate statistics of the incidents of
piracy and armed robbery against ships, to collate these statistics under both
type and area and to assess the nature of the attacks with special emphasis on
types of attack, accurate geographical location and modus operandi of
the wrongdoers and to disseminate or publish these statistics to all interested
parties in a format that is understandable and usable. Advanced intelligence
could also prove useful in obtaining information to Governments in order to be
able to act in a coordinated manner even before an attack occurs. Based on the
statistics of the incidents and any intelligence of piracy and armed robbery
against ships Governments should issue to ships entitled to fly their flag, as
necessary, advice and guidance on any appropriate additional precautionary
measures ships may need to put in place to protect themselves from attack.
Governments should involve representatives of shipowners and seafarers in
developing these measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery
against ships.
2 In any ongoing
campaign against piracy and armed robbery, it is necessary, wherever possible,
to neutralize the activities of pirates and armed robbers. As these people are
criminals under both international law and most national laws, this task will
generally fall to the security forces of the States involved. Governments
should avoid engaging in negotiations with these criminals and seek to bring
perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery against ships to justice. Negotiating
with criminals in a case regarding hijacking of a ship may encourage potential
perpetrators to seek economic revenue through piracy.
Self protection
3 Ships can and
should take measures to protect themselves from pirates and armed robbers.
These measures are recommended in MSC.1/Circ.1334. While security forces can
often advise on these measures, and flag States are required to take such
measures as are necessary to ensure that owners and masters accept their
responsibility, ultimately it is the responsibility of owners, companies, ship
operators and masters to take seamanlike precautions when their ships navigate
in areas where the threat of piracy and armed robbery exists. Flag States
should make shipowners/ companies aware of any UN Security Council, IMO, or any
other UN resolutions on piracy and any recommendations therein relevant for the
shipowner, ship operator, the master and crew when operating in areas where
piracy or armed robbery against ships occur.
4 With respect to
the carriage of firearms on board, the flag State should be aware that merchant
ships and fishing vessels entering the territorial sea and/or ports of another
State are subject to that State’s legislation. It should be borne in mind that
importation of firearms is subject to port and coastal State regulations. It
should also be borne in mind that carrying firearms may pose an even greater
danger if the ship is carrying flammable cargo or similar types of dangerous
goods.
Non-arming of seafarers
5 For legal and
safety reasons, flag States should strongly discourage the carrying and use of
firearms by seafarers for personal protection or for the protection of a ship.
Seafarers are civilians and the use of firearms requires special training and
aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is
great. Carriage of arms on board ships may encourage attackers to carry
firearms or even more dangerous weapons, thereby escalating an already
dangerous situation. Any firearm on board may itself become an attractive
target for an attacker.
Use of unarmed security personnel
6 The use of
unarmed security personnel is a matter for individual shipowners, companies,
and ship operators to decide. It should be fully acceptable to provide an
enhanced lookout capability this way.
Use of privately contracted armed security
personnel
7 The use of
privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships may lead to an
escalation of violence. The carriage of such personnel and their weapons is
subject to flag State legislation and policies and is a matter for flag States
to determine in consultation with shipowners, companies, and ship operators, if
and under which conditions this will be allowed. Flag States should take into
account the possible escalation of violence which could result from carriage of
armed personnel on board merchant ships, when deciding on its policy.
Military teams or law enforcement officers duly
authorized by Government
8 The use of
military, or law enforcement officers duly authorized by the Government of the
flag State to carry firearms for the security of the ship is a matter for the
flag State to authorize in consultation with shipowners, companies, and ship
operators. Flag States should provide clarity of their policy on the use of
such teams on board vessels entitled to fly their flag.
Action plans
9 The coastal
State/port State should develop action plans detailing how to prevent such an
attack in the first place and actions to take in case of an attack. Coastal
States should consider their obligations under SOLAS regulation XI-2/7 on
Threats to ships which requires, inter alia, where a risk of attack has
been identified, the Contracting Government concerned shall advise the ships
concerned and their Administrations of:
.1
the current security level;
.2
any security measures that should be put in place by the ships concerned to
protect themselves from attack, in accordance with the provisions of part A of
the ISPS Code; and
.3
security measures that the coastal State has decided to put in place, as
appropriate.
Also, due to the possibility of collision or grounding of a ship as a
result of an attack, the coastal State/port State will need to coordinate these
action plans with existing plans to counter any subsequent oil spills or leakages
of hazardous substances that the ship or ships may be carrying. This is
especially important in areas of restricted navigation. The coastal State/port
State should acquire the necessary equipment to ensure safety in waters under
their jurisdiction.
10 Flag States should develop
action plans detailing the response to be taken on the receipt of a report of
an attack and how to assist the owners, companies1, managers and
operators of a ship in case of a hijacking. A point of contact through which
the ships entitled to fly their flag may request advice or assistance when
sailing in waters deemed to present a heightened threat and to which such ships
can report any security concerns about other ships, movements or communications
in the area, should be provided.
11 All national agencies
involved in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships
should take appropriate measures for the purpose of maximizing efficiency and
effectiveness and, at the same time, minimizing any relevant adversity. The
coastal State/port State should also establish the necessary infrastructure and
operational arrangements for the purpose of preventing and suppressing piracy
and armed robbery against ships.
12 States and relevant international
organizations are encouraged to support capacity-building in areas or regions
where piracy and armed robbery against ships is known to occur.2
____________________
1 The term
"company" is defined in SOLAS regulations IX/1 and XI-2/1.
2 The ReCAAP
Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) undertakes capacity-building
initiatives to enhance the capability of ReCAAP Contracting Parties in
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. The Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP) is a government-to-government Agreement that addresses the
incidence of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The status of
ReCAAP ISC is an IGO. Further details may be found at www.recaap.org.
Similar arrangements are being developed by IMO in other regions.
13 Where ships are employed by
a United Nations (UN) humanitarian programme for the delivery of humanitarian
aid into areas at heightened threat, where such ships are to be escorted by
warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and
identifiable as being on Government service, such escorts should be implemented
in conformity with international law and UN resolutions. The flag State of the
ship being escorted should endeavour to conclude any necessary agreements in
respect of such ships entitled to fly their flag with the State(s) providing
the escorts.
14 Article 100 of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires all States to
cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy. In this
regard, States interested in the security of maritime activities should take an
active part in repression of and fight against piracy, particularly in areas
where the United Nations Security Council expresses concern about the imminent
threat of attacks by pirates and calls upon States to do so. This could be done
by prosecuting suspected pirates, contributing to capacity building efforts and
by deploying naval vessels and aircraft in accordance with international law to
patrol the affected areas.
15 On communication and
cooperation between various agencies, and the response time after an incident
has been reported to the coastal State:
.1
an incident command system for tactical as well as operational response should
be adopted in each country concerned to provide a common terminology;
integrated communications; a unified command structure; consolidated action
plans; a manageable span of control; designated incident facilities; and
comprehensive resource management;
.2
existing mechanisms for dealing with other maritime security matters, e.g.,
smuggling, drug-trafficking and terrorism, should be incorporated into the
incident command system in order to allow for efficient use of limited
resources;
.3
procedures for rapidly relaying alerts received by communication centres to the
entity responsible for action should be developed or, if existing, kept under
review; and
.4
Governments should by bilateral or multilateral agreements cooperate in
establishing, when appropriate, a single point of contact for ships to report
piracy threats or activities in specific high threat areas.
16 It is imperative that all
attacks, or threats of attacks, are reported immediately to the nearest RCC1
or coast radio station to alert the coastal State/port State and followed up by
a more detailed written report.2 On receipt of radio reports of an attack
or post attack reports, the RCC or other agency involved must take immediate
action to:
.1
inform the local security authorities so that contingency plans (counter
action) may be implemented;
.2
alert other ships in the area to the incident utilizing any appropriate
communication means available to it, in order to create or increase their
awareness; and
.3
inform the adjacent RCCs when appropriate.3
_________________________________
1 In the
Asian region, the RCCs of some ReCAAP Contracting Parties are also the ReCAAP
Focal Points. The RCCs of the coastal States disseminate information of an
incident internally to their respective Focal Points, maritime authorities and
law enforcement agencies, as deemed appropriate. A similar system is being
developed for the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean area under the Djibouti
Code of Conduct.
2 Flow
diagrams for reporting incidents are attached as appendices 1 and 2.
3 A template
for Ships’ Message Formats is attached as appendix 4.
17 The report received by
maritime Administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by the
flag State to the Government of the coastal State in which the incident
occurred. This will also provide the basis for the report to IMO.
18 Coastal States/port States
should report to IMO any act of armed robbery in their waters or acts of piracy
close to their waters which have been reported to them or, if such a report has
not been made, where they have information of an incident because of the
geographical proximity to the incident or due to the participation in the
apprehension of the perpetrators. The format presently used for reports to IMO
is attached at appendix 5.
19 The recording and initial
examination of reports is best done, wherever possible, by a central agency
possessing the necessary skills and resources. In order to maintain the
required credibility, both from Government and commercial sectors, such an
agency must be accurate, authoritative, efficient and impartial in both its
product and its dealings with others. It is judged that the Organization best
suited to this role continues to be IMO itself, although the use of IMB’s
Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the ReCAAP Information
Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore, the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa
or similar arrangement, as a satellite for dissemination of information should
also be considered.
20 The detailed work of
assessment should be carried out by the security forces of the coastal State
concerned who will probably have access to further information to complete the
picture and background of the attacks and those persons responsible.
21 It is important that, once
the collection and collation stages have been completed, the product be
distributed to all agencies requiring that information. These agencies include
the Governments of coastal States for dissemination of the information, the
Governments of flag States for distributing it through maritime Administrations
to shipowners/company, ship operators, to other interested Government
departments and other interested agencies and relevant international
organizations such as ReCAAP ISC. See appendices to this circular regarding the
information sharing and incident reporting process.
22 To encourage masters to
report all incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships, coastal
States/port States should make every endeavour to ensure that these masters and
their ships will not be unduly delayed that the ship will not be burdened with
additional costs related to such reporting, and the welfare of the crew will be
taken into account.
23 Flag, port and coastal
States are encouraged to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements1 to
facilitate the investigation of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
States should cooperate to investigate fully all acts or attempted acts of
piracy and armed robbery against ships entitled to fly their flag. Flag, port
and coastal States are encouraged to inform other States and organizations of
any relevant experience they may have obtained during the investigation, which
other States may benefit from. States should implement the Code of Practice for
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, IMO
resolution A.922(22) or subsequent resolutions.
________________
1 The
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is an initiative that demonstrates a multilateral Government-to-Government
agreement. Also see appendix 2 to this circular regarding the information
sharing and incident reporting process in the Asian region.
24 On investigation into
reported incidents and prosecution of pirates and armed robbers when caught:
.1
it should be firmly established which entity in each country has responsibility
and legal authority for carrying out post-attack investigations, since lack of
clarity during the hours after an incident may result in missed investigative
opportunities and loss or deterioration of evidence;
.2
the appointed investigation agency should have personnel trained in standard
investigative techniques and who are familiar with the legal requirements of
the courts of their countries, as it is widely assumed that prosecution,
conviction and confiscation of assets of offenders are the most effective means
of discouraging would-be offenders;
.3
as offenders may be involved in other kinds of offences, piracy and armed
robbery against ships should not be viewed in isolation and useful information
should, therefore, be sought in existing criminal records; and
.4
systems should be in place to ensure that potentially useful information is
disseminated to all appropriate parties, including investigators.
25 IMO regularly sends to
coastal States reports of armed robbery stated to have been committed in their
territorial waters, requesting information on the result of any investigations
they have conducted. Coastal States are requested to respond to these inquiries
even when they are unable to conduct an inquiry either because the incident was
not reported or was reported too late for an investigation to be conducted. Any
such responses should continue to be circulated to the sessions of the
Committee.
Criminal jurisdiction
26 A person apprehended at sea
outside the territorial sea of any State for committing acts of piracy or armed
robbery against ships, should be prosecuted under the laws of the investigating
State by mutual agreement with other substantially interested States.
Substantially interested State means a State:
.1
which is the flag State of a ship that is the subject of an investigation; or
.2
in whose territorial sea an incident has occurred; or
.3
where an incident caused, or threatened, serious harm to the environment of
that State, or within those areas over which the State is entitled to exercise
jurisdiction as recognized under international law; or
.4
where the consequences of an incident caused, or threatened, serious harm to
that State or to artificial islands, installations or structures over which it
is entitled to exercise jurisdiction; or
.5
where, as a result of an incident, nationals of that State lost their lives or
received serious injuries; or
.6
that has at its disposal important information that may be of use to the
investigation; or
.7
that, for some other reason, establishes an interest that is considered
significant by the lead investigating State; or
.8
that was requested by another State to assist in the repression of violence
against crews, passengers, ships and cargoes or the collection of evidence; or
.9
that intervened under UNCLOS article 100, exercised its right of visit, under
UNCLOS article 110, or effected the seizure of a pirate/armed robber, ship or
aircraft under UNCLOS article 105 or in port or on land.
27 States are recommended to
take such measures as may be necessary to establish their jurisdiction over the
offences of piracy and armed robbery at sea, including adjustment of their
legislation, if necessary, to enable those States to apprehend and prosecute
persons committing such offences.
28 For visits to ports in certain
countries, ships need to carry amounts of money in cash to cover disbursements
and other requirements. Cash on board a ship acts as a magnet for attackers.
Where the carriage of large sums of cash is necessary because of exchange
control restrictions in some States, these States are urged to take a more
flexible approach.
29 Flag States should require
all ships operating in waters where attacks occur to have measures to prevent
attacks and attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery against ships and on
how to act if such an attack or attempted attack occurs, as part of the
emergency response procedures in the safety management system, or part of the
ship security plan. Such measures should include a full spectrum of appropriate
passive and active security measures. The ship security plan and emergency
response plans should be based on a risk assessment which take into account the
basic parameters of the operation including:
.1
the risks that may be faced;
.2
the ship’s actual size, freeboard, maximum speed and the type of cargo, which
is being transported;
.3
the number of crew members available, their capability and training;
.4
the ability to establish secure areas on board ship; and
.5
the equipment on board, including any surveillance and detection equipment that
has been provided.
Ships not covered by the ISM Code or the ISPS Code should be required to
take similar precautionary measures.
30 Bearing in mind that ships
already have in their procedures the ability to take preventive measures,
Governments should use caution when considering the use of security levels 1, 2
and 3 in the ISPS Code for piracy and armed robbery situations.
31 If at all possible, ships
should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to have taken place
and, in particular, seek to avoid bottlenecks. If ships are approaching ports
where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor, rather than on ships
underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some
time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow steaming or
longer routeing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during
which the ship will be at risk. Such action should not affect the ship’s
berthing priority. Charter party agreements should recognize that ships may
need to deviate away from areas where attacks occur and that ships may need to
delay arrival at such ports, either when no berth is available for the ship, or
offshore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period.
32 Coastal States situated
in areas affected by piracy and armed robbery
.1
in order to be able to respond, as quickly as possible, to any report from
ships on piracy and armed robbery attacks, every piracy or armed robbery threat
area should be adequately covered by Coast Earth Stations which are
continuously operational, and which preferably are situated in the littoral
State responsible for the area or in neighbouring States;
.2
neighbouring countries having common borders in areas which can be
characterized as piracy and armed robbery threat areas should establish
cooperation agreements with respect to preventing and suppressing piracy and
armed robbery1. Such agreements should include the coordination of
patrol activities in such areas. An example of a model agreement is attached as
appendix 6;
____________________________________
1 Examples of
such agreements include the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), details of which may be found
at www.recaap.org;
the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Regional Integrated
Coast Guard Network in West and Central Africa; and the Code of Conduct
concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the Djibouti Code of Conduct).
.3
on further development of regional cooperation, a regional agreement to
facilitate coordinated response at the tactical as well as the operational
level should be concluded between the countries concerned:
.3.1
such an agreement
should specify how information would be disseminated; establish joint command
and control procedures (a regional incident command system); ensure efficient
communications; set policies for joint operations and entry and pursuit;
establish the links between entities involved in all maritime security matters;
establish joint specialized training of and the exchange of views between
investigators; and establish joint exercises between tactical and operational
entities; and
.3.2
that existing
agreements, bilateral or regional, be reviewed, if necessary, to allow for the
extension of entry and pursuit into the territorial sea of the State(s) with
which the agreement has been made and practical operational procedures which
will ensure the granting of permission to extend pursuit into another
jurisdiction being received by the pursuing vessel at very short notice;
.4
as piracy and armed robbery against ships is not only a regional but a global
problem, the established regional cooperation forums should ensure cooperation
amongst themselves and the IMO in order to draw on the different experiences
gained;
.5
every country is recommended to ensure that each national RCC, which may be
contacted by RCCs from other countries, is capable at all times of
communicating in English. Thus, at least one person with a satisfactory knowledge
of the English language – both written and spoken – should always be on duty;
.6
in order to minimize coordination problems and possible delays in cases when
distress/safety messages related to a specific area are received by Coast Earth
Stations and RCCs in other countries, it is recommended to arrange common
meetings/seminars for key personnel from both areas for the exchange of views
and to establish suitable procedures and actions in different types of
situations. Consideration should also be given to arranging common exercises to
verify that procedures and actions are effective;
.7
if an attack is reported in an area covered by NAVTEX transmissions, a
piracy/armed robbery attack warning with category "Important" or
"Vital", as appropriate, should be transmitted whenever such warnings
can be transmitted sufficiently early to enable ships to take precautions
appropriate to preventing attacks. If an attack is reported in an area which is
not covered by NAVTEX transmissions, a piracy/armed robbery attack warning
should be transmitted as an EGC SafetyNET message through the INMARSAT system.
In this respect, relevant authorities are recommended to make arrangements with
one or more Coast Earth Station(s) covering relevant areas, so as to be
registered as "information providers"; and
.8
those countries that have established, or which plan to establish, radar
surveillance systems, are recommended to investigate the potential suitability
of such facilities for anti-piracy/armed robbery purposes. If such facilities
are judged to be suitable for such purposes, the facilities and procedures
necessary for their rapid and efficient use should be established.
33 Governments should
coordinate with the shipowner or the company and the coastal State when
receiving a ship security alert. It is important that any response to an
incident is well planned and executed, and emphasizes the safety of the crew.
Those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment. Therefore,
those responsible for responding to acts of piracy or armed robbery of ships,
whether at sea or in port, should be trained in the general layout and features
of the types of ship most likely to be encountered. Shipowners should be
encouraged to cooperate with the security forces by providing access to their
ships for the necessary familiarization.
34 Coastal States should
consider the use of suitably equipped helicopters and other suitable means in
countering acts of piracy and armed robbery. Security forces should consider
the use of modern night vision equipment and other applicable modern
technology.
35 A local rule of the road
amendment allowing ships under attack to flash or occult their "not under
command" lights should be authorized in areas where pirate/armed robbery
attacks are more common.
36 States with adjacent
coastal waters affected by pirates and armed robbers should develop or maintain
coordinated patrols by both ships and aircraft.
37 Security forces and
Governments should maintain close liaison with their counterparts in
neighbouring States to facilitate the apprehension and prosecution of criminals
involved in such unlawful acts. Some countries have already a well established
coordination which is also used for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed
robbery.
38 RCC personnel should be
instructed on the most efficient means of communicating reports on piracy and
armed robbery, which they receive. Depending on the circumstances, this may require
forwarding the reports to another RCC or coast radio station, notifying
security forces or patrol craft in the area and taking steps to have a
broadcast warning issued or other suitable action taken.
39 RCCs should be encouraged
to forward all received reports of piracy and armed robbery to IMO. States are
encouraged to share any information with IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre and the
ReCAAP Focal Points.
APPENDIX 1
STATISTICS, FLOW DIAGRAMS AND OTHER
RELEVANT INFORMATION
Flow diagram for attacks in coastal
waters
APPENDIX 2
FLOW DIAGRAM FOR REPORTING INCIDENTS
IN ASIA
Notes:
1. In the Asian region, the RCCs of some ReCAAP
Contracting Parties are also their ReCAAP Focal Points (FPs). These Focal
Points also disseminate incident information internally to their respective
RCCs, maritime authorities and law enforcement agencies as appropriate.
2. Coastal States (in the context of this
addendum) refer only to those who are Contracting Parties to the ReCAAP.
3. The incident reporting process in Asia does
not change other reporting processes for incidents already in practice.
APPENDIX 3
"PHASES" RELATED TO VOYAGES IN PIRACY
AND ARMED ROBBERY THREAT AREAS
|
Phase Symbol |
Phase Description |
|
A |
Approaching a
piracy/armed robbery threat area (1 hour prior to entering) |
|
B |
Entering a
piracy/armed robbery threat area |
|
C |
Inside a piracy/armed
robbery threat area, but no suspect piracy/armed robbery vessel detected |